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11 Introduction
A major problem of labor contracts arises from the fact that often workers’
eﬀorts, their human capital investments, or their outputs cannot be veriﬁed
by a third party. These workers’ inputs or outputs, respectively, are usu-
ally called unveriﬁable or non-contractible, because explicit labor contracts
cannot be made contingent on them. Therefore, labor contracts are often
incomplete giving room for opportunistic behavior. Consider, for example,
t h ec a s eo fu n v e r i ﬁable ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital, which is sketched by
Kanemoto and McLeod (1989, p. 386). If the worker is paid before he has
made his investment, this worker will have no incentive to invest in his hu-
man capital afterwards. If, the other way round, the employer promises to
compensate the worker after having made the investment, later on the em-
ployer can renege on the original agreement and does not pay the promised
wage.1 W h e nt h ew o r k e ra n t i c i p a t e st h ee m p l o y e r ’ so p p o r t u n i s t i cb e h a v i o r ,
he will underinvest in his human capital. In total, following Kanemoto and
MacLeod we can speak of a double-sided moral hazard problem.
Malcomson (1984, 1986) has oﬀered a general solution to the unveriﬁ-
ability problem. He shows that tournament compensation schemes will be
contractible, even if the workers’ labor inputs or outputs are unveriﬁable.
Tournaments compensate workers according to the ordinal ranks of their
inputs or outputs, respectively, where the tournament prizes are speciﬁed
in advance, before the tournament has started. This last point is decisive,
1Here, there is an hold-up problem, where the employer captures the quasi-rent which
is generated by the worker’s speciﬁc investment.
2because the ﬁxed tournament prizes are usually contractible so that the em-
ployer cannot save labor costs opportunistically by understating the workers’
results. By anticipating this, workers have incentives to exert eﬀort or to
invest in human capital to attain the winner prize in the tournament.
In the evolutionary process of labor market institutions, two diﬀerent
types of tournaments have evolved as alternative solutions to the unveriﬁ-
ability problem (see Kanemoto and MacLeod 1989, pp. 386-388; 1992, pp.
144-147). The ﬁrst type can be called U-type tournament, because they are
typical of U.S. ﬁrms (see, e.g., Baker, Gibbs, and Holmström 1994a, 1994b).
Here, the tournament prizes are wages that are attached to jobs along a ﬁrm’s
hierarchy. These wages are rising with the hierarchy level, where the jobs
are located. On each level of the hierarchy, workers compete in tournaments
against each other to win a promotion to the next level. Thus, the winner
prize consists of the wage increase by being promoted to the next level. Since
the hierarchical wage structure of a ﬁrm is usually veriﬁable, such U-type
tournaments prevent employers from opportunistic behavior and, thereby,
workers from underinvestment in eﬀort or human capital, respectively.
The second type of tournament can be found in Japanese ﬁrms and will be
called J-type tournament. The central component of this kind of tournament
is an aggregate wage bill which is the outcome of a bargaining process between
the employer and the local union.2 For example, this wage bill can be the
s u mo ft h eb o n u sp a y m e n t sw h i c ha r eb i a n n u a l l yg i v e nt ot h e i rw o r k e r sb y
2It is typical for the Japanese labor market that all workers of a single ﬁrm are repre-
sented by a single union which acts as a ”voice mechanism”.
3large Japanese ﬁrms.3 When the employer has agreed upon the aggregate
wage bill, he can no longer save labor costs by opportunistically rating his
workers’ results, because the wage bill is veriﬁable. The wage bill is then
shared among the workers by using a tournament. In Japanese ﬁrms, there
are no strictly separated jobs which are precisely deﬁned by special sets of
tasks that are delegated to single jobs. In other words, there are no deﬁnite
demarcation lines between ”jobs” in Japan. Therefore, wages cannot be
attached to jobs as in U-type tournaments. They have to be attached to
persons. For this purpose, each Japanese worker takes place in a rating or
assessment process (called ”satei”), in which the workers are subjectively
judged by their supervisors (e.g., Itoh 1991; Endo 1994). There is a kind of
tournament between the workers, because the more merit points a worker
has made the larger is his individual share in the aggregate wage bill. For
example, if there are two workers, A and B, which are rated by a supervisor
who declares that A has performed three times as good as B,t h e nA will
receive 75% of the wage bill and B only 25%.4
This paper oﬀers an analytical comparison between U-type and J-type
tournaments to show under which conditions a U-type tournament will dom-
inate a J-type tournament and vice versa.5 Both tournament types are based
3Such bonus payments are of great importance to Japanese workers, because bonuses
can make up 18-22% of a worker’s yearly income; see Kanemoto and MacLeod (1992, p.
145). Other authors even speak of nearly 30%; see Itoh (1991, pp. 348-350); Ito (1992,
pp. 231-239).
4Of course, the Japanese rating and compensation system is much more complex, but
this paper only focuses on the diﬀerences between the two stylized types of tournaments.
5Note that only two stylized types of tournaments are discussed in the paper, which
4on the same general idea to solve the unveriﬁability problem — the employer
commits himself by ﬁxing an aggregate wage structure or an aggregate wage
bill in advance. Nevertheless, the following results will show that despite the
same general idea the two tournament types will have speciﬁc advantages
and disadvantages: If workers are homogeneous and risk neutral either tour-
nament type will lead to ﬁrst-best eﬀorts given that the employer faces a
zero-proﬁt condition. If, however, the employer has all the bargaining power
U-type tournaments will again achieve ﬁrst-best eﬀorts which will not hold
for J-type tournaments in general. With heterogeneous workers neither tour-
nament will usually yield ﬁrst-best outcomes. But labor costs may be lower
for the employer in the U-type tournament. On the other hand, a J-type
tournament may dominate a U-type one if workers are risk averse or if one
o ft h ew o r k e r sh a sal e a d .
Before starting with the basic model it is important to emphasize that
J-type tournaments entail some analytical diﬃculties. For this tournament
type, we have to compute the expected quotient of a worker’s output and
total output of both workers. Unfortunately, it is not unusual that this
expected value does not exist (see Mood, Graybill and Boes 1974, p. 181).
For this reason, the standard Lazear-Rosen framework using a production
technology that is linear in eﬀort and exogenous noise has not been adopted
in this paper. Instead, a two-point distribution (i.e., each worker’s output is
does not allow a direct comparison between real U.S. and Japanese labor practices. For
example, U-type tournaments can also be found in some Japanese ﬁrms when workers
compete against each other in promotion tournaments along the vertical hierarchy (see
Itoh 1991).
5either high or low) is used assuming that a worker’s eﬀort is identical with his
probability of realizing the high output. By this, we can calculate expected
outcomes without any problem. As an alternative, one could strictly focus on
the unveriﬁability problem and neglect any uncertainty. This setting would
be appropriate for mimicking situations where a worker’s output is mainly
determined by eﬀort instead of luck. This alternative modelling is used in
a companion paper (see Kräkel 2001). However, neglecting any uncertainty
will yield the same problem as in the Lazear-Rosen framework if there is not
suﬃcient noise (i.e., if the density of the composed random variable is not
ﬂat enough): In U-type tournaments, pure-strategy equilibria do not exist.
Of course, mixed-strategy equilibria make U-type tournaments less attractive
from an employer’s viewpoint (e.g., U-type tournaments no longer yield ﬁrst-
best outcomes). Nevertheless, U-type tournaments may still dominate J-type
ones, when the number of participants is not too large.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the basic model is intro-
duced. As a benchmark result it is shown that both tournament types lead to
ﬁrst-best eﬀorts when workers are risk neutral, homogeneous and have all the
bargaining power. Section 3 considers the opposite case where the employer
has all the bargaining power. Section 4 deals with heterogeneous and Section
5 with risk averse workers. Section 6 discusses the implications of one worker
having a lead in the tournament. Further aspects that are important when
comparing U-type and J-type tournaments are verbally discussed in Section
7. Section 8 concludes.
62 The Basic Model
A( U - t y p eo rJ - t y p e )ﬁrm employs two risk neutral workers, A and B.T h e
employer is assumed to be risk neutral, too. Each worker i (i = A,B)
chooses an eﬀort ei ∈ (0,1) which is unobservable by the employer (hidden
action).6 The output (in monetary terms) of each worker i, πi, can take on
one of two possible values: πi ∈ {πl,πh} with πl < πh. The high output πh
is realized with probability ei and the low output πl with probability 1 − ei
(i = A,B). Thus, by exerting eﬀort the workers can inﬂuence the probability
of a high output. Obviously, each eﬀort choice ei ∈ (0,1) l e a d st oad i ﬀerent
probability distribution or lottery (πh,e i;πl,1 − ei), where (πh,e 00;πl,1 − e00)
dominates (πh,e 0;πl,1 − e0) within the meaning of ﬁrst-order stochastic dom-
inance when e00 >e 0. It is assumed that the πi are stochastically independent
and unveriﬁable, but observable by all parties. Each worker’s expected utility
can be characterized by his expected wage payment minus his disutility of
eﬀort which is (in monetary terms) described by the cost function c(ei) with
c(0) = 0, c0(ei) > 0,a n dc00 (ei) > 0. As in Lazear and Rosen (1981) it is as-
sumed that the workers have all the bargaining power and the employer has
to maximize the workers’ expected utilities for a given zero-proﬁtc o n d i t i o n .
As a reference solution the ﬁrst-best eﬀort c a nb ec a l c u l a t e d .H e r e ,i ti s




0−1 (πh − πl)( i = A,B) (1)
6Alternatively, ei can be interpreted as human capital investment. The standardization
of the variable ei is necessary, because subsequently it is used as a probability.
7as ﬁrst-best eﬀort, where c0−1 (·) is the inverse of the marginal cost function
c0 (·).T h i si n v e r s ec0−1 (·) is an increasing function because of the convexity
of c(ei).
Now, we can derive the equilibrium outcomes of the two tournament types
in the given basic model. Either tournament can be described by a two-stage
game. On the ﬁrst stage, the owner chooses a winner and a loser prize (in the
U-type tournament), or an aggregate wage bill (in the J-type tournament).
On the second stage, the two workers compete against each other by choosing
their eﬀort variables.
In the U-type tournament the employer decides about a loser prize w2 ≥ 0
and a winner prize w1 ≥ w2, before the competition between the two workers
starts. On the second stage, each worker i (i = A,B; j 6= i) exerts eﬀort ei
to maximize his expected utility
EUi (ei)=w1ei (1 − ej)+
w1 + w2
2
(eiej +( 1− ei)(1− ej)) (2)
+w2 (1 − ei)ej − c(ei).
With probability ei (1 − ej) worker i becomes the winner of the tournament
and receives the winner prize w1. He gets the loser prize w2 with probability
(1 − ei)ej. If the two workers produce identical outputs, the winner of the
tournament will be randomly chosen by the employer using a fair coin.7
This event happens with probability eiej +( 1− ei)(1− ej).T h eﬁrst-order
7As an alternative, total payment w1 + w2 is shared equally between A and B.I fw1
and w2 correspond to certain jobs, then the employer will use job rotation to share the
payment equally.









(i = A,B). (3)
Eq. (3) shows that the optimal eﬀort eU
i will be large, if the winner prize
is high, the loser prize w2 (as a kind of fall-back position) is low, and the
marginal cost function c0 (·) has a ﬂat shape. eU
i can be interpreted as worker
i0s r e a c t i o nf u n c t i o nt ot h ee m p l o y e r ’ sc h o i c eo fw1 and w2.
On the ﬁrst stage, the employer chooses w1 and w2 to maximize workers’
expected utilities EUi (ei) subject to the incentive compatibility constraint
(3) and the zero-proﬁtc o n d i t i o n
w1 + w2 =2 ( πhei + πl (1 − ei)) ⇔
w1 + w2
2
= πl +( πh − πl)ei. (4)
Condition (4) requires that total labor costs equal total expected output.
Since workers behave symmetrically on the second stage (i.e., eU
A = eU
B =: eU),
it suﬃces to consider only one of the workers on the ﬁrst stage. Because of













































with eU0 := dc0−1 (x)/dx. Eqs. (7) and (8) show that ﬁrst-best eﬀort is
achieved in the U-type tournament, i.e. eU = c0−1 (πh − πl)=eFB.
In the J-type tournament, the employer chooses an aggregate wage bill9





wei (1 − ej)+
w
2




w(1 − ei)ej − c(ei). (9)
Hence, worker i receives the fraction πi/(πi + πj) of the aggregate wage bill
w in each of the four events (πh,πl), (πl,πh), (πl,πl),a n d(πh,πh).T h e









(i = A,B). (10)
On the ﬁrst stage, the employer chooses w for maximizing EUi (ei) given by




= πl +( πh − πl)ei. (11)
Because of the symmetric outcome of the second-stage subgame (i.e. eJ
A =
9The bargaining process between the employer and the local union is neglected here to
make both kinds of tournaments comparable. In addition, local unions also exist in the
United States. Thus, in many cases the hierarchical wage structure (w1,w 2) is a bargaining
outcome, too.
10Again, the second-order condition holds.
10eJ




















































with eJ0 := dc0−1 (x)/dx. According to Eq. (13), the employer chooses
the aggregate wage bill w =2 ( πh + πl) that leads to ﬁrst-best eﬀort eJ =
c0−1 (πh − πl)=eFB.
The previous ﬁndings can be summarized in the following proposition:11
Proposition 1 If the workers are homogeneous and risk neutral, and have
all the bargaining power, then eU
i = eJ
i = eFB (i = A,B).
According to the benchmark result of Proposition 1, both tournament
types yield ﬁrst-best outcomes under the given conditions. It can easily
be shown that the result will also hold for n>2 workers in a symmetric
equilibrium (see the Appendix).12 Because of risk neutrality there is no
trade-oﬀ between incentives and risk sharing, i.e. the employer can always
set appropriate incentives without a risk premium. Homogeneity among the
two workers ensures symmetric equilibria in the tournament subgame on the
11For the outcome of the U-type tournament see also Lazear and Rosen (1981), pp.
844-846.
12Hence, tournament size does not play the same decisive role as in Kräkel (2001).
11second stage. Thereby, choosing a uniform wage structure (w1,w 2) or w for
both workers cannot lead to distorted incentives for one of the workers in the
tournament. Altogether, Proposition 1 may explain why both tournament
types can be observed in practice at the same time. Unfortunately, the given
conditions — homogeneity, risk neutrality, zero-proﬁt condition — can hardly
be found in practice. Hence, these three conditions will be dropped in the
f o l l o w i n gs e c t i o n st oc o m p a r et h eU - t y p ea n dt h eJ - t y p et o u r n a m e n ti na
more realistic setting.
3 Reversed Bargaining Power
In contrast to Section 2, now it is assumed that the employer has all the
bargaining power. In other words, the zero-proﬁt condition is replaced by
the standard principal-agent assumption that each worker has a reservation
value ¯ v and the employer wants to maximize expected proﬁts net oﬀ labor
costs w1+w2 or w, respectively. The solution to the employer’s maximization
problem has to meet two restrictions — the workers’ incentive constraint given
by Eq. (3) or Eq. (10), respectively, and the participation constraint which
can be written as (w1 + w2)/2−c(ei) ≥ ¯ v or w/2−c(ei) ≥ ¯ v because of the
symmetric tournament outcome, which does not depend on the distribution
of bargaining power. The following result can be obtained:
Proposition 2 I ft h ew o r k e r sa r eh o m o g e n e o u sa n dr i s kn e u t r a l ,a n dt h e
employer has all the bargaining power, then eU
i = eFB (i = A,B),b u ti n
general eJ
i 6= eFB (i = A,B).
12Proof. See the Appendix.
The ﬁndings of Proposition 2 are surprising: Despite homogeneity and
risk neutrality the J-type tournament does usually not lead to ﬁrst-best ef-
forts any longer when the employer instead of the workers has all the bargain-
ing power. However, the U-type tournament again yields ﬁrst-best eﬀorts.
Now we can discuss what causes the diﬀerence between the U-type and
t h eJ - t y p er e s u l t . A tﬁrst sight, one can speculate that the sharing rule
πi/(πi + πj) leads away from ﬁrst-best eﬀort. For the J-type tournament
t h e r ed o e sn o te x i s tat r a d e - o ﬀ between incentives and risk sharing, too. But
since πi is both part of the numerator and part of the denominator, the shar-
ing rule generates another trade-oﬀ:e x e r t i n gm o r ee ﬀort raises the expected
value of the numerator as well as the expected value of the denominator. Eq.
(A19) in the Appendix , however, shows that this new trade-oﬀ is not the
major problem: theoretically, the employer can induce ﬁrst-best incentives
by choosing w =2( πh + πl).
The diﬀerence between the U-type and the J-type result can be better
explained by the number of the employer’s personnel policy variables. In the
U-type tournament the employer has two policy variables, w1 and w2, and two
restrictions, the incentive and the participation constraint. By appropriately
choosing w1 and w2 the employer can meet both restrictions when maximizing
his expected surplus. A J-type employer also has two restrictions, but he
has only one policy variable − the total wage bill w. In general, w cannot
meet both restrictions at the same time when expected surplus is maximized.
Proposition 1 shows that this problem vanishes under a zero-proﬁtc o n d i t i o n ,
13which can be directly substituted into the employer’s objective function. By
this, the employer eﬀectively has only to meet one restriction — the incentive
constraint. In this maximization problem, the employer is able to achieve
the ﬁrst-best solution even with only one policy variable w.
4 Heterogeneous Workers
In this section, it is assumed that workers have diﬀerent cost functions
cA (eA)=c(eA) and cB (eB)=k · c(eB) where c(·) is convex and k>0
with k 6=1 . Depending on whether k<1 or k>1,w o r k e rB has a cost
advantage or a cost disadvantage compared to worker A, respectively. Now,













The following results can be derived:
Proposition 3 Let the workers be heterogeneous and risk neutral:








(ii) If the employer has all the bargaining power, both participation con-







B in general. In the U-type tournament at
least one participation constraint is binding, which cannot be guaranteed in
the J-type tournament.
Proof. See the Appendix.
14The proposition shows that heterogeneity prevents the employer from
achieving ﬁrst-best outcomes in either tournament type in general. Even in
t h eU - t y p et o u r n a m e n tﬁrst-best eﬀorts cannot be guaranteed any longer,
when workers are heterogeneous. The intuition for this ﬁnding is that in
both tournament types the employer has to choose a uniform wage structure
for both workers. But since heterogeneous workers react diﬀerently to the
same wage structure this will typically lead to distorted incentives.13
When the workers have all the bargaining power, the employer is forced
to maximize the expected utilities of both workers with the same wage policy
(w1,w 2) or w, respectively. But this is impossible, because from the incentive
constraints we know that the two workers choose diﬀerent eﬀorts given a
uniform wage policy, since k 6=1 . In the U-type tournament, the employer
still has two policy variables w1 and w2,w h e r e a st h eJ - t y p ee m p l o y e rc a n
only decide about the total wage bill w. Nevertheless, this comparative
advantage for the U-type employer does not apply here, because the reaction
functions eA = eA (w1,w 2) and eB = eB (w1,w 2) only depend on the prize
spread ∆w := w1 − w2. In other words, when the workers have all the
bargaining power both kinds of tournaments become rather similar − the
employer must solely care for the workers’ incentives and these incentives
can only be controlled by a single policy variable ∆w or w, respectively.
13Of course, if the employer is able to identify the two types of workers, he can solve
his incentive problem by introducing a handicap system or by organizing two separate
tournaments for A-type and B-type workers, respectively (see Lazear and Rosen 1981, pp.
861-863).
15When the employer has all the bargaining power, in the U-type tourna-
ment the employer’s maximization problem is constrained by four restric-
tions, but he still has only two policy variables. In general, binding par-
ticipation constraints for both workers and ﬁrst-best eﬀorts do not hold at
the same time. The possibility of ﬁrst-best eﬀorts cannot be completely ex-
cluded. But then ﬁrst-best implementation is costly for the employer in gen-
eral: one participation constraint will not be binding, which means that the
employer will have relatively high labor costs, because one worker gets more
than his reservation value. Compared to the case of homogeneous workers,
now there will be a welfare loss due to heterogeneity. This loss is completely
borne by the employer, since each worker at least receives his reservation
value. Similar results hold for the J-type tournament. But Proposition 3
shows that U-type tournaments may still lead to better results than J-type
tournaments. When ﬁrst-best eﬀort is implemented without two binding
participation constraints, in the U-type tournament there is one binding par-
ticipation constraint, whereas in the J-type tournament there may be no
binding participation constraints. This result also seems to be intuitively
plausible. Obviously, in the U-type tournament at least one participation
constraint must be binding, because otherwise the employer can still lower
w1 and w2 to save labor costs. When decreasing w1 and w2 by the same
amount this cost saving policy will not result in distorted incentives, because
eU





) only depends on the prize spread ∆w.I nt h eJ - t y p e
tournament, the employer’s only policy variable is w. Decreasing w to make
one of the participation constraints binding will automatically decrease the
16workers eﬀorts, too. In other words, also the case of heterogeneous workers
indicates that the U-type tournament may be more advantageous compared
to the J-type tournament because of a greater number of policy variables.
5 Risk Averse Workers
Now, we drop the risk neutrality assumption of the basic model which seems
to be crucial for obtaining ﬁrst-best eﬀorts in either tournament type under
homogeneity and a zero-proﬁt condition. To focus on the impact of risk
aversion homogeneous workers and a zero-proﬁt condition are assumed in
this section, too. It is assumed that each worker i has a concave utility
function which gives him utility u(wi − c(ei)) when receiving a wage wi in
any tournament type. To derive explicit solutions for the equilibrium eﬀorts
the cost function is assumed to be quadratic: c(ei)=0 .5ce2
i with c>0.14 For
simplicity, the analysis is restricted to the most plausible case of symmetric
equilibria.
It is well-known that introducing risk aversion into tournaments implies
some analytical diﬃculties. Hence, as in Lazear and Rosen (1981, pp. 852-
853) and McLaughlin (1988, pp. 228-231) ﬁrst-order and second-order Taylor
series expansions are used to derive approximate results. Let, again, ∆π =
πh − πl and ∆w = w1 − w2,a n dl e tr = −u00/u0 denote the Arrow-Pratt
coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion. The following results can be obtained:15
14This assumption is not crucial. Without it equilibrium eﬀorts can be described im-
plicitly, see Lazear and Rosen (1981), McLaughlin (1988).
15To be precise, in the U-type tournament r = −u00((w1 + w2)/2 − c(eU))/u 0((w1 +
17Proposition 4 In a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium of a U-type tour-











on the second stage.16 In a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium of a J-type






















If r →∞ ,t h e n∆w = eU =0 ,b u tw = 3
2c
πl+πh
∆π and eJ = 3
4.
Proof. See the Appendix
According to Proposition 4 neither the U-type nor the J-type tournament
will lead to ﬁrst-best eﬀort eFB = ∆π/c if workers are risk averse. From
Eq. (16) this is obvious for the U-type tournament. Since r>0 we have
eU <e FB. In the J-type tournament, w =2 ( πl +πh) would induce ﬁrst-best
eﬀorts according to Eq. (18). But inserting w =2 ( πl+πh) into Eq. (17) and
solving for eJ s h o w st h a tt h ec o e ﬃcient of risk aversion r does not cancel out.
w2)/2 − c(eU)) a n di nt h eJ - t y p et o u r n a m e n tr = −u00(w/2 − c(eJ))/u0(w/2 − c(eJ)).
Following McLaughlin (1988), fn. 4, we do not diﬀerentiate between these two expressions
in detail to focus on the major diﬀerences between the two tournament types.
16Note that with quadratic costs we have to assume ∆π <cso that eFB = ∆π/c can
be interpreted as probability. This assumption also ensures that eU < 1.
18The intuition for this results is the same as in the basic principal-agent model
with hidden action: Risk aversion causes a trade-oﬀ between incentives and
risk sharing and, therefore, in equilibrium the principal prefers not to induce
full incentives.
More interestingly, Proposition 4 shows that the J-type tournament will
d o m i n a t et h eU - t y p et o u r n a m e n t( i . e . ,eJ >e U =0 ) if workers are suﬃ-
ciently risk averse.17 This result is also intuitively plausible. In the U-type
tournament, there is always considerable risk for the workers since only two
outcomes are possible corresponding to quite diﬀerent utility levels — a worker
becomes the winner of the tournament and receives u(w1−c(eU)) or he loses
and only gets u(w2 − c(eU)) << u(w1 − c(eU)).18 Since in the symmetric
equilibrium the probability mass is equally distributed between these two
events, a U-type tournament represents a very risky lottery for the workers.
On the other hand, in the J-type tournament the workers’ wages (i.e., their
shares in the wage bill w) directly depend on the magnitude of the realized
outputs. Hence, this tournament type has strong parallels to a piece rate
system and from Lazear and Rosen (1881) we already know that piece rates
are relatively advantageous when workers are risk averse since the mass of
t h ei n c o m ed i s t r i b u t i o ni sc o n c e n t r a t e dn e a rt h em e a n . I nc a s eo faJ - t y p e
tournament this means that for each worker the most likely outcome is to
realize a utility level u(w/2 − c(eJ)). In the simple model considered here,
only three outcomes are possible: A worker realizes u(πh/(πl+πh)·w−c(eJ))
17Note that eJ =3 /4 is not an extreme small value since ei ∈ (0,1).









19or u(πl/(πl + πh) · w − c(eJ)) each with probability eJ −
£
eJ¤2,o rh ee n d s
up with u(w/2 − c(eJ)) with probability 2
£
eJ¤2 +1− 2eJ. It can easily be
checked, that 2
£
eJ¤2 +1− 2eJ >e J −
£
eJ¤2 for all possible values of eJ.
6W o r k e r w i t h a L e a d
As is known in the literature, tournaments may suﬀer from intermediate in-
formation (see, e.g. McLaughlin 1988, p. 249; Prendergast and Topel 1993a,
p. 362): In practice, tournaments are not one-shot games but reach over sev-
eral periods. If during this time workers get intermediate information about
who is leading and who has been left behind incentives may immediately
break down. In this section, it will be analyzed which type of tournament
d e a l sb e t t e rw i t ht h i sp r o b l e m .
For analytical tractability some simplifying assumptions have to be intro-
duced. To derive explicit solutions for the equilibrium eﬀorts, again the cost
function is assumed to be quadratic: c(ei)=ce2
i with c>0.19 Both workers
are homogeneous and risk neutral, and the employer faces a zero-proﬁtc o n -
dition. It is assumed that the employer has chosen a ﬁrst-best wage structure
∆w = w1−w2 =2 ( πh−πl)=2 ∆π or w =2 ( πl+πh), respectively, before the
tournament starts. We will then look at a random shock that exogenously
happens at the beginning of the tournament: Worker j (j = A or j = B)
gets a lead λ > 0, i.e. his output already amounts to λ before both workers
choose their eﬀorts and realize πi and πj. At last, for analytical tractability
19Again, assuming ∆π <cguarantees equilibrium eﬀorts that lie between zero and one.
20let πl =0and πh = π > 0. Therefore, ∆w = w =2 π.T h i sm o d e lv a r i a n t
leads to the following Proposition.20
Proposition 5 If λ > π,t h e neJ
i >e U
i =0(i = A,B).
If λ < π,t h e neJ
i >e U
i given that c and λ are suﬃciently small, otherwise
eJ
i <e U
i (i = A,B).
Proof. See the Appendix
The intuition for the ﬁrst part of. Proposition 5 is as follows: If λ > π,i n
t h eU - t y p et o u r n a m e n tw o r k e rj will have such a large lead that worker i will
have no chance to catch up with him. Thus, the best the two workers can do
is to choose zero eﬀorts for minimizing their eﬀort costs. On the other hand,
in the J-type tournament the workers’ wages πi/(πi + πj) · w (i = A,B)
directly depend on the concrete magnitude of their realized outputs. By
this, each worker will always have an incentive to choose a positive eﬀort
irrespective of whether one of them has a lead or not.
However, the second part of Proposition 5 shows that J-type tournaments
do not always work better than U-type ones when workers have a lead. Given
λ < π, J-type tournaments will only remain more favorable than U-type
ones if the cost parameter c and the lead λ are not too large. In the U-
type tournament, due to the ordinal ranking incentives are independent of
the speciﬁcv a l u eo fλ given λ < π. But this is not true for the J-type
tournament. Here, equilibrium eﬀorts will be decreasing in λ if c and λ are
relatively high (see the Appendix). In this situation, incentives are rather low
20Without the simplifying assumptions πl =0and πh = π,a l s ot w oc a s e sh a v et ob e
distinguished: λ > ∆π and λ < ∆π.
21i nt h eJ - t y p et o u r n a m e n t ,b e c a u s ee ﬀort is very costly and workers become
discouraged by the high lead. Hence, if the lead is not prohibitively high
(i.e., if we have λ < π), then a U-type tournament may lead to better work
incentives because of its winner-take-all character.
7 Further Discussion
There are further aspects which are important when comparing U-type and
J-type tournaments, but which have not been discussed formally in the pre-
vious sections. First, J-type tournaments are accompanied by a subjective
performance evaluation (”satei”). Here, a supervisor subjectively collect per-
formance information about the individual workers which is typically unver-
iﬁable. But because such subjective assessments leave room for favoritism
(Prendergast and Topel 1993b), inﬂuence activities (Milgrom and Roberts
1988) and hidden gaming (Laﬀont 1988, 1990) J-type tournaments seem to
have an additional disadvantage compared to U-type tournaments. However,
at ﬁrst sight this argument does not hold. In practice, U-type tournaments of-
ten need subjective performance evaluation, too, when supervisors are asked
to give recommendations for promotions. In this context, the same problems
as in the J-type tournament may also arise in the U-type one.
Nevertheless, there are good reasons why attaching wages to jobs and
p r o m o t i n gw o r k e r st oad i ﬀerent job in a U-type tournament can mitigate
problems due to subjective assessments which does not hold for a J-type
tournament, since it is not accompanied by job promotion. For example, we
22can think of a three-level hierarchy with the employer on the highest level,
a supervisor on the middle level, and two workers on the lowest level. If the
supervisor has to recommend one of the two workers for a job promotion,
he might play a hidden game with them. The supervisor could announce to
recommend the worker who is willing to pay the highest bribe. This worker
need not be the one with the highest output or with the highest talent. For
simplicity, we can assume symmetric uncertainty about the workers’ talents
(i.e., at the beginning of the game neither the employer nor the two workers
know the exact talents) and that the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property
(MLRP) holds so that a worker’s realized output in the tournament and ex-
pected talent can be treated as similar from the employer’s viewpoint when
deciding about promotion. Now, the employer can decide to tie the supervi-
sor’s compensation to the future performance of the promoted worker, to the
future performance of the department where the worker is promoted, or even
to ﬁrm’s performance (see also Prendergast and Topel 1993a, p. 360). By
this, hidden gaming will not work. Ex post, the supervisor will always recom-
mend the worker with the highest output who is also the one with the highest
expected talent because of the MLRP. Anticipating this, no worker is willing
to pay any bribe to the supervisor in the previous hidden game. Moreover,
work incentives are restored because each worker wants to be promoted and
can be sure of the supervisor’s honesty when making recommendations.
Attaching wages to jobs in a U-type (or promotion) tournament also
mitigates problems due to favoritism (Prendergast and Topel 1993b, pp. 38-
44). Let us again assume the above sketched model with symmetric talent
23uncertainty and MLRP. If wages are attached to jobs the supervisor can only
do his most preferred worker a favor by recommending him for promotion
to the better paid job. But if the employer ties the supervisor’s pay to
ﬁrm performance and attaches the highest wages to key jobs which need the
most talented workers to guarantee a high ﬁrm output, the supervisor will
realize high opportunity costs from favoritism. This lessens the probability
of favoritism. By anticipating that the supervisor will honestly recommend
the most talented worker (with a high probability), the workers will choose
high eﬀorts in the initial tournament because of the wage increase following
a promotion and because of the MLRP.
A similar point is made by Fairbum and Malcomson (1994) who also
discuss a model with symmetric talent uncertainty and MLRP. They empha-
size that in any tournament that is not combined with a job promotion the
employer ex post will be indiﬀerent whom to declare the winner of the tourna-
ment. Hence, the winner prize will be auctioned among the workers who use
bribes as bids. By this, the worker with the highest bribe becomes the winner
of the tournament, and anticipating this no worker is willing to exert more
than minimal eﬀort. However, the situation is completely diﬀerent when the
winner of the tournament is promotedt oa ni m p o r t a n ta n dd e m a n d i n gj o b
on a higher hierarchy level which needs a worker with high talent. Due to
t h eM L R Pa s s u m p t i o nt h ee m p l o y e rp r o m o t e st h ew o r k e rw i t ht h eb e s tp e r -
formance in the tournament. Again, by anticipating the employer’s behavior
workers’ incentives in the U-type tournament are restored. To summarize,
there exist several situations in practice where U-type tournaments, which
24combine prizes with job assignments, work better than J-type tournaments
when subjective performance evaluation is needed. As such unveriﬁable per-
formance measurement has been the key assumption and the starting point of
this paper we have an important additional advantage of U-type tournaments
compared to J-type ones.21
A completely diﬀerent aspect is the ﬁltering of common noise which is
one of the central motives for using tournaments (see Lazear and Rosen 1981,
pp. 856-857; Holmström 1982; Green and Stokey 1983). We can assume, for
example, a linear Lazear-Rosen like production technology so that the output
of worker i (i = A,B) is described by πi = ei + εi + η.A g a i n ei denotes
eﬀort, εi represents individual and η common noise. Of course, in the U-
type tournament the common noise η is ﬁltered out: Worker i’s winning
probability is described by prob{πi > πj}. This probability can be simpliﬁed
to prob{εj − εi <e i − ej} which does not depend on η.H o w e v e r , J - t y p e
tournaments do not have this desirable property. Since worker i’s wage in
the J-type tournament is given by the fraction πi(πi + πj) of the aggregate
wage bill w,c o m m o nn o i s eη is not ﬁltered out. Thus, if ﬁltering of common
n o i s ei sa ni m p o r t a n to b j e c t i v eo fa ne m p l o y e rh ew i l lp r e f e rU - t y p et oJ - t y p e
tournaments.
At last, it has to be pointed out that there are some parallels between
J-type tournaments and piece rate or bonus systems, since wages in J-type
21However, when introducing a supervisor in the Fairburn-Malcomson model there may
be ineﬃciently many or ineﬃciently few promotions given that workers are risk averse, see
Fairburn and Malcomson (2001).
25tournaments do not only depend on rank but are directly inﬂuenced by a
worker’s output level. This common feature of piece rates and J-type tour-
naments implies that J-type tournaments also have similar advantages (e.g.,
in connection with risk aversion; see Section 5) and disadvantages (e.g., no
ﬁltering of common noise) as piece rate systems. In addition, J-type tour-
naments can even come closer to piece rates by modifying the given wage
structure. Especially, we can think of a wage bill w(ei,e j) that is no longer
exogenous in the tournament subgame. For example, this would mimic the
stylized fact that negotiated bonus payments in Japanese ﬁrms also depend
on ﬁrm performance. Note that in the simple model considered in this paper
ﬁrm performance is described by πi+πj. Hence, we can assume that the frac-
tion w = α·(πi + πj)( 0< α < 1) is paid as aggregate wage bill in the J-type
tournament. Substituting this expression into worker i’s wage wi =
πi
πi+πjw
leads to wi = α · πi. In other words, in this variant the J-type tournament
is identical with a piece rate system. But it is important to stress that in
all model variants with w(ei,e j) the central property of tournaments — con-
tractibility despite the existence of unveriﬁable eﬀorts and outputs of workers
— is lost. In case of w(ei,e j) and unveriﬁable performance the employer will
always be able to save labor costs by claiming that the workers’ performance
has been low.
268 Conclusions
In this paper, U-type and J-type tournaments have been compared to analyze
under which conditions U-type tournaments dominate J-type ones and vice
versa. The ﬁndings show that both tournament types will yield ﬁrst-best ef-
forts if workers are homogeneous and risk neutral and have all the bargaining
power (i.e., the employer faces a zero-proﬁt condition). With heterogenous
workers, neither tournament type leads to ﬁrst-best eﬀorts in general. The
analytical results and the discussion also show that U-type tournaments will
be dominant, if the employer has all the bargaining power, if there are workers
with medium-sized leads, if problems due to subjective performance evalua-
tion are severe, and if ﬁltering of common noise is important. On the other
hand, J-type tournaments will dominate U-type tournaments, if workers are
substantially risk averse and if there are workers with small or large leads.
Altogether, the analysis also helps to explain why these two tournament types
c a nb eb o t ho b s e r v e di np r a c t i c ea n dw h yt h e yh a v ee v o l v e di nt h ee v o l u t i o n
of labor market institutions.
27Appendix
First-best outcomes in tournaments with n>2 workers:
As indicated in the text the analysis is restricted to symmetric equilibria
which are the most plausible ones in case of homogeneity. Let ei again denote
worker i’s eﬀort and ej = e the uniform eﬀort of each other worker j 6= i.
Worker i’s expected utility in the U-type tournament can then be written
(using a binomial distribution) as





















































(1 − ei)(1− e)
n−1 − c(ei)















(1 − ei)(1− e)
n−1 − c(ei)
with ∆w = w1 − w2.The ﬁrst-order condition ∂EUi/∂ei =0together with




















28Shortly, the incentive constraint (A1) yields eU = eU (∆w) for a given n.

















= πl + ∆πe
U (A3)
with ∆π = πh − πl. Inserting eU = eU (∆w) a n d( A 3 )i n t o( A 2 )w eo b t a i n






= πl + ∆πe


















it immediately follows that eU = c0−1 (∆π)=eFB.





























, and the zero-proﬁt condition is given by w













again leads to ﬁrst-best eﬀort.
29Proof of Proposition 2:
Because of symmetry, it suﬃces to consider only one of the workers. In the
U-type tournament, the employer’s maximization problem can be described
by the following Lagrangian:














− c(ei) − ¯ v
¸
(A7)
with λ1 and λ2 as multipliers. The optimality conditions for ei,w 1, and w2
are:
πh − πl − λ1c




























− c(ei) ≥ ¯ v (A12)





− c(ei) − ¯ v
¸
=0 . (A14)
From Eqs. (A9) and (A10) we obtain λ2 =1(i.e., the participation constraint



















. Hence, we have a kind of ”winner-takes-it-all lottery”, where ex ante each worker
wins with probability 1
2 and has an expected utility that equals his reservation value ¯ v.
Ex post, however, the winner (loser) gets more (less) than his reservation value ¯ v.T h i s
generates strong incentives in the tournament.
30For the J-type tournament, a Lagrangian can be constructed analogously:













− c(ei) − ¯ v
i
. (A16)
T h eo p t i m a l i t yc o n d i t i o n sf o rei and w are:
πh − πl − λ1c


















− c(ei) ≥ ¯ v (A20)




− c(ei) − ¯ v
i
=0 . (A22)
Conditions (A17)−( A 2 2 )s h o wt h a t ,i ng e n e r a l ,t h eJ - t y p et o u r n a m e n tw i l l
not lead to the ﬁrst-best eﬀort. To generate ﬁrst-best eﬀort in the J-type
tournament the multipliers have to be λ1 =0and λ2 =1i nE q .( A 1 7 ) .I n
addition, this makes condition (A18) hold. In (A19) the aggregate wage bill
has to be w =2( πh + πl). Condition (A20) has to hold with equality because
of λ2 =1 . But since ¯ v and w are certain numbers, this last requirement is
usually not met. Hence, in general eJ
i 6= eFB (i = A,B).
Proof of Proposition 3:
(i) Let ∆π = πh−πl.I nt h eU-type tournament, the zero-proﬁt condition
is given by
w1 + w2 = ∆π(eA + eB)+2 πl (A23)














with ∆w = w1 − w2. The employer maximizes EUi (ei) a c c o r d i n gt oE q .
(2) (with ci (ei) instead of c(ei))f o ri = A and i = B subject to (A23) and
(A24). Substituting (A23) into (2) gives
EUi (ei)=( ∆π(ei + ej)+2 πl − w2)ei (1 − ej)
+
∆π(ei + ej)+2 πl
2
(2eiej +1− ej − ei)
+w2 (1 − ei)ej − ci (ei) (A25)




∂w2 =0( i = A,B)
subject to (A24) after some rearranging yield eA = eB,w h i c hb yu s i n g( A 2 4 )
requires k =1 . But this contradicts the heterogeneity assumption k 6=1 .
Hence, the employer cannot maximize the expected utilities of both workers
a tt h es a m et i m ea n da c h i e v et h eﬁrst-best solution.
In the J-type tournament, the employer’s zero-proﬁt condition is described














Because of the zero-proﬁt condition the employer has to maximize
EUi (ei)=( ∆π(ei + ej)+2 πl)
∆π(ei − ej)+πl + πh
2(πh + πl)
− ci (ei) (A27)
(i,j = A,B; i 6= j) with respect to w subject to (A26). It can easily be
s h o w nt h a tt h ee m p l o y e rw i l ln o tb ea b l et om a x i m i z eb o t hEUA (eA) and
32EUB (eB) with the same aggregate wage bill w if k 6=1 . Hence, there is no
ﬁrst-best solution in the J-type tournament, too.
(ii) In the U-type tournament the Lagrangian for the employer’s maxi-
mization problem is:































− kc(eB) − ¯ v
¸
. (A28)
The ﬁrst line in (A28) corresponds to the employer’s expected surplus. The
second and the fourth line describe the incentive constraints for the two
workers. The third and the ﬁfth line characterize the workers’ participation
constraints, which follow from Eq. (2) and from eA 6= eB in general. In the





























































− ci (ei) ≥ ¯ v (A34)
33with i,j = A,B, i 6= j,a n dλ2,λ4 ≥ 0. Eqs. (A31) and (A32) together
yield λ2 + λ4 =2 , which implies that at least one participation constraint
must be binding. Thus, we have to consider two diﬀerent cases: First, let
us assume that both participation constraints are binding, i.e. (A34) holds
with equality. To implement ﬁrst-best eﬀorts eFB
A and eFB
B , the employer has
to choose ∆w =2 ∆π in (A33). Altogether, ﬁrst-best eﬀorts and binding


































In general, the three expressions in (A35) will not be identical.23
Secondly, when only one of the participation constraints is binding, ﬁrst-
best eﬀorts may be consistent with the optimality conditions (A29)−(A34).
But then one of the workers gets more than his reservation value, i.e. the
employer can only implement the ﬁrst-best eﬀo r ta th i g hc o s t s .
23For example, in case of quadratic costs c(ei)=0 .5e2
i the ﬁrst and the third expression
in (A35) require k =1 , which contradicts the heterogeneity condition k 6=1 .
34The Lagrangian in the J-type tournament is:














∆π(eA − eB)+πh + πl
πh + πl















∆π(eB − eA)+πh + πl
πh + πl
− kc(eB) − ¯ v
¸
. (A36)
Analogous optimality conditions as in the U-type tournament can be used to
distinguish between two cases: First, if both participation constraints bind
and the employer wants to implement ﬁrst-best eﬀorts (i.e., w =2( πh + πl)),































Again, these three expressions are not identical in general.
Secondly, if at least one participation constraint does not bind, ﬁrst-
best eﬀorts may be implementable. But now, it is even possible that both
constraints do not bind, because λ2 = λ4 =0may be consistent with the
optimality conditions.
Proof of Proposition 4:
35I nt h eU - t y p ec a s e ,w o r k e ri’s expected utility can be written as
EUi (ei)=u(w1 − c(ei))ei (1 − ej)+u(w1 − c(ei))
eiej +( 1− ei)(1− ej)
2
+u(w2 − c(ei))
eiej +( 1− ei)(1− ej)
2








u(w2 − c(ei))(ej − ei +1 ). (A38)
The workers’ ﬁrst-order condition ∂EUi/∂ei =0yields after inserting the
















u0 (w1 − c(eU)) + u0 (w2 − c(eU))
. (A39)
Following McLaughlin (1988, p.228) we deﬁne yt = wt−c
¡
eU¢
(t =1 ,2) and
¯ y =( y1 + y2)/2= ¯ w − c
¡
eU¢
with ¯ w =( w1 + w2)/2. Second-order Taylor
series expansion of the numerator of (A39) gives




(y1 − ¯ y)
2 u
00(¯ y)
−u(¯ y) − (y2 − ¯ y)u
0 (¯ y) −
1
2




0 (¯ y), (A40)
since y1 − ¯ y = −(y2 − ¯ y)=∆w/2.U s i n gaﬁrst-order expansion to approxi-
mate the denominator of (A39) yields
u
0 (y1)+u
0 (y2) ≈ u
0 (¯ y)+( y1 − ¯ y)u
00 (¯ y)+u
0 (¯ y)+( y2 − ¯ y)u
00(¯ y)
=2 u
0 (¯ y). (A41)

























The employer has to maximize (A43) subject to (A42) and the zero-proﬁt
condition ¯ w = πl + ∆πeU. Using the quadratic cost function, (A42) can be
written as eU = ∆w/(2c). Substituting this and the zero-proﬁt condition into














































with r = −u00(¯ y)/u0(¯ y) as coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion. Inserting (A45)
in eU = ∆w/(2c) we obtain Eq. (16).





















From the ﬁrst-order condition ∂EUi/∂ei =0together with the symmetry


































. Using ﬁrst-order Taylor series approximation, the numerator
of (A47) can be written as
[u(ym)+( yh − ym)u
0(ym)](1 − e
J)+u(ym)(2e
J − 1) (A48)







The same approximation method for the denominator gives
[u






























so that the incentive constraint (A47) can be simpliﬁed to Eq. (18) because
of the quadratic cost function. Using the symmetry condition ei = ej = eJ,
and yh, ym and yl in (A46) the workers’ expected utility in equilibrium can














Inserting the zero-proﬁt condition w
2 = πl + ∆πeJ(w) into (A50) with eJ(w)































































after some rearranging leads to Eq. (17) using the fact that deJ/dw = ∆π/
(2c(πl + πh)) and r := −u00(ym)/u0(ym).
Now the last part of Proposition 4 can easily be checked. From (15) and
(16) we immediately have lim
r−→∞∆w =l i m
r−→∞eU =0 . Dividing both sides of
















Together with Eq. (18) we get the last result of Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 5:
I nt h eU - t y p et o u r n a m e n tw i t hλ < π the workers’ objective functions
are given by
EUi (ei)=w1ei (1 − ej)+w2 [1 − ei (1 − ej)] − c(ei)
EUj (ej)=w2 (1 − ej)ei + w1 [1 − (1 − ej)ei] − c(ej).






c2 + ∆w2 =
2cπ





c2 + ∆w2 =
4π2
c2 +4 π2 .
















w(1 − ej)ei − c(ej).
The ﬁrst-order conditions together with the quadratic cost function and w =




2π2c(π + λ)(2π + λ)
2
4π4 (π2 + c2)+c2λ(3π + λ)
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4π4 (π2 + c2)+c2λ(3π + λ)
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3π3 +8 π2λ +5 πλ
2 + λ
3¢




4π5 (π + λ)
(2π + λ)
¡
π3 +5 π2λ +4 πλ
2 + λ
3¢
which is true for suﬃciently small c and also for suﬃciently small λ since the
right-hand sides of the two inequalities are both strictly decreasing in λ.








4 +2 8 λπ4 +2 5 λ
3π2 +8 π5 + λ
5)c2 − (16π +1 2 λ)π6
¡









5(−4π6 +2 0 π4c2)+5 2 c2λπ3 +4 9 c2λ








since we have to assume π <cto ensure eFB = ∆π/c ∈ (0,1).
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